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Abstract In this paper, we try to explain the intergovernmental negotiation of the Lisbon treaty
from a rational choice perspective with the aid of power index analysis. There are two aspects
of the reform of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council that we find puzzling. The first
one is that, according to Shapley-Shubik index based on the notion of power as the distribution
of a fixed prize, small and medium-sized member states have lost power as compared to the Nice
treaty, which conflicts with the unanimity requirement for treaty reform. The second one is that,
according to the Banzhaf measure based on the notion of power as influence, the Lisbon treaty
leaves all member states worse off in absolute terms as compared to the Convention’s draft.
We propose the measure developed by Steunenberg et al. (1999) as a possible solution to these
paradoxes, and draw some conclusions about the nature of EU policy making and power index
analysis.
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1. Introduction
Agreeing to new rules for a qualified majority in the Council has proven to be one of
the main hurdles in the reform of the Nice Treaty that envisaged the establishment of
a Constitution for Europe and ended up in the current Lisbon Treaty. The new voting
rules substituted the triple majority requirement of Nice (72% of weighted votes, 50%
of member states and 62% of the population) with a double majority system (55% of
member states and 65% of the population). In between was the Convention’s draft
treaty that contained a less stringent double majority rule (50% of member states and
60% of the population).
In this paper, we analyze the intergovernmental negotiation of the Lisbon treaty
from a rational choice perspective. Other studies have focused on the efficiency or the
fairness of the new rules from a normative perspective (Laruelle and Widgre´n 1998;
Leech 2002). But in this paper, we analyze the negotiation process from a positive
perspective, trying to understand the negotiating positions of the individual member
state governments that made the final outcome possible. This is an instance of how
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formal models can also be applied to the analysis of a particular case (Bates et al. 1998;
McLean 2003). Of course, the results of the analysis can provide us with insights for
other cases.
There are two aspects of the negotiation process that we find puzzling. The first
one concerns the final outcome of the negotiations and we call it the “redistribution
paradox”. According to the results of recent studies using the normalized Banzhaf
power index to analyze the distribution of voting power between member states un-
der these three institutional arrangements, some member states, namely medium-sized
member states such as Poland or Spain, would lose relative voting power in favour of
other states, namely large and small member states (see Algaba et al. 2007; Felsenthal
and Machover 2007). This outcome contrasts with the unanimity requirement for the
amendment of EU treaties.
In this paper, we confirm the existence of a large scale redistribution of power
between member states when computing the Shapley-Shubik power index, which is
better suited to the notion of politics as the distribution of a fixed prize between the
players (P-power). Such redistribution of voting power may have important budgetary
implications if we take into account that both theoretical models and empirical analyses
of fiscal redistribution in the EU reveal a strong relationship between voting power and
budget allocation (Rodden 2002; Kauppi et al. 2004).
In order to solve this paradox, we make recourse to a different type of power mea-
sure based on the notion of power as influence (I-power), namely the Banzhaf measure.
This resolves the “redistribution paradox” but creates a new one, which concerns the
negotiation process itself, and in particular the movement from the 50–60 rule in the
Convention’s draft to the final 55–65 rule of the Lisbon Treaty. Apparently, this amend-
ment made each and every member state worse off relative to the original proposal of
the Convention. But why would any member state reject a draft treaty arguing that it
reduced its voting power and then promote a new deal that further reduced that power?
We refer to this puzzle as the “efficiency paradox”.
In this paper, we will try to analyse these two paradoxes with the help of power
indices computed through computer simulation techniques. One of the main advan-
tages of models based on computer simulations is that they can deal with a high degree
of complexity that would be difficult to manage by analytical models (Kollman et al.
2003). This allows adapting the model to different assumptions relatively easily, such
as different voting rules, different preferences, different notions of power (division of
a fixed prize vs. influence) or different nature of the political choices (binary or grad-
ual). In doing so we cover three main power indices, namely Shapley-Shubik (1954),
Banzhaf (1965) and the measure developed by Steunenberg, Smidtchen and Koboldt
(1999). We compute the indices for the Nice treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the
Convention’s draft treaty that was considered in between. We come to the conclusion
that the latter measure is better suited to explain the nature of EU politics and resolves
the above mentioned paradoxes to a great extent.
The rest of the paper will be divided in six sections. In Section 2, we will review the
literature on treaty negotiations and power index analyses applied to the EU. In Section
3, we will present the main indices and voting rules analyzed in this paper (Nice,
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Convention and Lisbon Treaty). In Sections 4 to 6, we will analyze those three different
institutional arrangements using three different measures by Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf,
and Steunenberg, Schmidtchen and Koboldt, respectively. Finally, in Section 7, we will
draw some general conclusions about the nature of Council voting and power index
analysis.
2. Literature review
This paper tries to explain the negotiation of the Lisbon treaty from a rational choice
perspective. In order to better understand the nature of bargaining and the interests
at stake, in this section, we briefly review the institutionalist literature on EU treaty
negotiations as well as the literature on power indices applied to EU decision making.
2.1 Explaining EU treaty negotiations
There are two main streams in the institutional literature on EU treaty negotiations
that differ in relation to the nature of bargaining, and in particular who the main ac-
tors are and whether they have power of veto or not. On the one hand, supranational
institutionalism stresses the role of actors above the nation state, such as European
institutions, international political leaders or transnational interest groups. The pres-
ence of logrolling and linkages allows political entrepreneurs to upgrade the interest of
member states beyond the lowest common denominator (e.g. Stone Sweet and Sand-
holtz 1997).
On the other hand, intergovernmental institutionalism stresses the role of member
state governments. As Moravcsik (1991) points out, without a “European hegemon”
capable of providing universal incentives or threats to promote regime formation and
without the widespread use of linkages and logrolling, the bargains struck in the EC
reflect the relative power positions of the member states. Thus, intergovernmental
institutionalism is characterized by lowest-common-denominator (veto group) deci-
sions among the largest member states, with smaller states receiving side-payments
and larger states subject to threats of exclusion.
Indeed, small states can be bought off with side payments, such as the expansion of
structural funds aimed at poorer regions of the EC, which was essential to the passage
of the internal market program of the Single European Act. This policy of “economic
and social cohesion” was not a vital element of economic liberalization, as the Com-
mission at times claimed, but was instead a side-payment to Ireland and the Southern
states in exchange for their political support. But larger states exercise a de facto veto
over fundamental changes in the scope or rules of the core element of the EC. Thus,
bargaining tends to converge toward the lowest common denominator of large state
interests (Moravcsik 1991).
The only tool that can impel a state to accept an outcome on a major issue that
it does not prefer to the status quo is the threat of exclusion. Once an international
institution has been created, exclusion can be expensive both because the excluded state
forfeits input into further decision making and because it forgoes whatever benefits
result. If two major states can isolate the third and credibly threaten it with exclusion,
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and if such exclusion undermines the substantive interests of the excluded state, the
coercive threat may bring about an agreement at a level of integration above the lowest
common denominator (Moravcsik 1991). Such a threat of a two-speed Europe may be
an effective way to force reluctant states to accept new initiatives such as the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but
is less likely to work for a reform of Council voting which is at the core of the EU.
Although supranational institutions such as the European Commission or the Eu-
ropean Parliament were present in the Convention that prepared the draft treaty that
served as a basis for the Lisbon treaty, in this paper, we argue that the main role in
the negotiations was played by member state governments. This is in line with our
nationally-based power index analysis. Each of those governments enjoyed a power
of veto over the final outcomes, and without the possibility of a credible threat of ex-
clusion, side-payments were the only means to convince reticent states to accept a new
voting system they did not like. But such an option was only viable for smaller member
states and/or minor issues.
2.2 Power index analysis of EU decision making
There is a rich literature using power indices to analyze the distribution of voting po-
wer between member states under different institutional arrangements in the EU (e.g.
Hosli 1996). Such ‘power indices’ represent the a priori probabilities of the member
states being pivotal or decisive, i.e. being able to turn a losing coalition into a winning
one, or vice versa. Such probabilities are usually expressed in relative terms, in such a
way that the power indices of all member states add up to unity, the most common of
such indices being the Shapley-Shubik index and the normalised Banzhaf index. But
power index analysis of Council voting has not been immune to criticism, for two main
reasons: (i) its assumptions on uniformly distributed preferences, and (ii) its apparent
failure to account for the sequential nature of the legislative game and strategic powers
such as agenda setting (Tsebelis and Garrett 1996; Garrett and Tsebelis 1999a,1999b).
In addition to that, a third source of controversy is the concept of power applied, which
can be based on influence (I-power) or the division of a fixed prize (P-power) (Felsen-
thal and Machover 1998). We will discuss those three issues in turn.
2.2.1 Preferences
Defendants of power indices have tried to address the first criticism in two main ways.
In some cases, power indices have been adapted to take into account the fact that some
coalitions are traditionally more likely to form than others (Hosli 1996). On other oc-
casions, power indices have been adapted in order to allow for connected coalitions
only, assuming a given configuration of preferences of the member states along a sin-
gle dimension (Hosli 1999). But such an assumption is debatable if one considers
that the political space may not be one-dimensional and therefore it is possible that
coalitions connect on dimensions other than the traditional left-right dimension. Barr
and Passarelli (2009), and Benati and Vitucci Marzetti (2011) are recent examples of
preference-augmented power indices.
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There are two main problems in preference-augmented power indices. On the one
hand, when one starts to assume given configurations of preferences, one of the main
advantages of power indices is lost, namely the preference neutrality that allows them
to make clear predictions in the absence of detailed information about preferences
(Hosli 1997, p. 358). On the other hand, the fact that a centrist member state with a
small number of votes is more often on the winning side of a coalition does not mean
that it has more voting power but rather more luck (Barry 1980a,1980b). When we take
preferences into consideration, indices cease to be voting power indices and become
voting success indices (Steunenberg et al. 1999).
As Dowding (1995, p. 57) points out, accurate preference-augmented models re-
quire such a great amount of data that ‘everything the model could teach us must
already be known.’ The great amount of data necessary makes this type of models
suitable almost exclusively to explain individual policy issues or what has been called
policy analysis (Lane and Berg 1999, p. 310).
Conversely, preference-neutral power indices assume that the preferences of the ac-
tors are not known and try to single out the influence of the legislative procedure. They
focus on constitutional modalities and abstract from other factors such as preferences,
which are neither fixed, nor known at the time constitutional decisions are taken. In
order to abstract from preferences, these models assume that the latter are uniformly
distributed. The result is a probability or an average of power. These models produce
clear predictions and require much less information. Although they are particularly rel-
evant to constitutional analysis, they also have applications in policy analysis, as their
insights can be applied to particular cases in order to denote the structural constraints
under which the negotiators operate (Dowding 1995; Lane and Berg 1999, p. 309).
2.2.2 The sequence of moves
Garrett and Tsebelis have criticised voting power analyses for neglecting strategic
agenda setting and have shown the serious consequences of this failure (Tsebelis and
Garrett 1996; Garrett and Tsebelis 1999a,1999b). In their defence of voting power
indices, Holler and Widgre´n (1999, p. 328) agree with the fact that voting power anal-
yses do not consider agenda-setting power but try to downplay this deficit by arguing
that the power of the agenda setter is exaggerated under the common assumption of
complete and symmetric information.
Steunenberg et al. (1999) address Garrett and Tsebelis’ criticism by developing a
power index that takes into account the strategic nature of the legislative game. Tra-
ditional power indices are based on co-operative game theory and consider different
legislative procedures simply as different coalition requirements of a voting body, un-
derstanding power as pivotality or decisiveness. Conversely, the model by Steunenberg
et al. (1999) is based on computer simulations of spatial models that assume an issue
space where ideal points of the actors and the status quo are located, and measure util-
ity as the distance between the outcome and an actor’s ideal point. Thus, in addition
to voting power, their model is able to account for agenda-setting power. A number of
recent models try to account for agenda setting as well (e.g. Barr and Passarelli 2009;
Benati and Vittucci Marzetti 2011; Napel and Widgre´n 2011).
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2.2.3 I-power vs. P-power
The third source of controversy concerns the concept of power that underlies power
indices. Felsenthal and Machover (1998) point out that there are two main ways to un-
derstand voting power. On the one hand, power as influence or I-power is conceived as
a voter’s potential influence over the outcome of decisions, namely whether proposed
bills are adopted or blocked. On the other hand, P-power is conceived of as a voter’s
expected relative share in a fixed prize available to the winning coalition under a de-
cision rule, seen in the guise of a simple cooperative game. The distinction between
these two underlying pre-formal notions of a priori voting power is essential because
I-power and P-power are fundamentally different.
As Machover (2000) points out, the notion of I-power has essentially nothing to do
with cooperative game theory. Under this conception, voting behaviour is motivated by
policy seeking and does not depend on bargaining or binding agreements. Therefore,
the very use of the term “coalition” as referring to an arbitrary set of voters may be
somewhat misleading in this case, as it may imply some sort of conscious coordina-
tion. The outcome of a proposal can be best seen as a public good affecting all voters,
irrespective of how they have voted. Note also that in the case of I-power one can
talk meaningfully not only about relative voting power but also about voting power in
absolute terms. In the case of I-power, the total amount of absolute power in a game is
given endogenously.
Conversely, P-power is based on cooperative game theory. It assumes office-
seeking voting behaviour aimed at winning, for the sake of obtaining part of the prize,
which is available only to the winners and therefore cannot be a public good in the true
sense. It also assumes bargaining and binding agreements. Also, P-power is an essen-
tially relative notion, and absolute P-power makes little sense because the absolute size
of the total prize is determined exogenously (Machover 2000).
Despite the fact that the index developed by Penrose (1946) and later popular-
ized by Banzhaf (1965) was based on the idea of I-power, the notion of P-power, on
which the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index was based, soon became the dominant app-
roach (Felsenthal and Machover 2005). But the idea of I-power that underlies the
Banzhaf measure also found support in authors such as Coleman (1968), for whom in
many, perhaps most, decision-making situations, the outcome of a division is not the
acquisition of power or any other private good by the winners, but a public good (or
public bad) that may affect all the voters and others, possibly in an open-ended way,
i.e., not a constant sum (Steunenberg et al. 1999; see also Barry 1980a,1980b; Morriss
1987). The indices developed by these authors were all closely related to the original
one developed by Penrose and Banzhaf (Steunenberg et al. 1999; Barry 1980a,1980b;
Felsenthal and Machover 2005).
3. The model
In this paper, we try to explain the reform of qualified majority voting in the Council
as part of the negotiations of the Lisbon treaty. The three voting rules that are analyzed
(Nice, Convention and Lisbon) are defined as follows:
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(i) Nice: 255 votes AND 62% of the population AND 50% of the member states;
(ii) Convention: 60% of the population AND 50% of the member states;
(iii) Lisbon: (65% of the population AND 55% of the member sates) OR 24 member
states.
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on Council decision making and abstract from
other institutional issues that were also part of the negotiations (reallocation of seats
in the European Parliament and reduction of the size of the European Commission).
A computational model like the one used in this paper could include the Commission
and the European Parliament relatively easily, but some of the model’s assumptions
might be controversial (such as assuming national blocks in the EP, for instance) and
distract attention away from the main points of the paper. By focusing on the Council,
we follow the tradition of the most commonly used power indices of EU decision
making.
We compute the voting power of different member states in the Council according
to three different power measures:
(i) the Shapley-Shubik index (1954);
(ii) the Banzhaf measure (Banzhaf 1965);
(iii) the measure proposed by Steunenberg, Schmidtchen and Koboldt (1999), here-
inafter referred to as SKK.
The Shapley-Shubik index is a well known index that is based on the notion of
power as the distribution of a fixed prize. We compute it by simulating the legislative
game for different orderings of member states and assigning the fixed price entirely
and exclusively to the member state that acts as a pivot. Thus the power indices of the
different players necessarily add to unity.
The Banzhaf and SSK measures are both based on the notion of power as influ-
ence. In fact, as Felsenthal and Machover (2001) have shown, the SSK measure is a
generalization of the Banzhaf measure that allows the incorporation of additional in-
formation about the legislative game. The main difference between both measures is
that the Banzhaf measure assumes that there is a choice between two symmetrical op-
tions, whereas the SSK measure assumes a multiple choice among equidistant points
along a single issue dimension. The SSK measure also allows the incorporation of
assumptions about the location of agenda setting power. The similarities between both
indices allow us to compute them using a common framework.
The legislative game is computer-simulated for randomly generated configurations
of preferences and the status quo. In the case of the Banzhaf measure, there are only
two options for the status quo and member state ideal points, which are uniformly dis-
tributed. In the case of the SSK measure, the status quo and member-state preferences
are assumed to be uniformly distributed among 27 equidistant points along a single
issue dimension. We do not assume a single interpretation of this dimension of conflict
in political terms. In a particular case, it may coincide with the traditional left-right di-
mension, the European integration dimension, the North-South dimension, East-West,
centre-periphery, new-old members, or any other dimension of conflict. This is be-
cause, by construction, our model assumes random preferences, an assumption which
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finds empirical support in a number of studies showing that decision making in the
Council in not characterized by the existence of stable coalitions across issues (see
Thomson et al. 2004).
Agenda-setting power is assumed to rotate among member states, which is in line
with the existence of a rotating presidency (see Kollman 2003). The agenda setter
submits a proposal to the Council for voting as a take-it-or-leave-it offer in a one-shot
game. Thus, the agenda setter will chose, among the available options, the one that is
closer to her ideal among those that will be supported (weakly preferred) by a qualified
majority in the Council, whose requirements vary depending on the voting rule applied
(see above).
The mean utility gain of each member state is recorded for each voting rule, and
the results can be found in the Appendix. The population data we have used corre-
sponds to the start of 2004, the year when the deal on the institutional details of the
Lisbon treaty was struck. Alternative dates would also be possible. For instance, the
original deal was intended to come into effect at the end of 2006, and due to difficul-
ties in the ratification process, the Lisbon treaty did not come into force until the end
of 2009. Furthermore, reticent states managed to postpone the entry into force of the
institutional provisions relating to QMV in the Council until 2014, and the new voting
rule will probably remain in force for some years thereafter. But considering popula-
tion projections instead of existing data may be a dubious exercise in the presence of
short-sighted politicians, and we find it an unnecessary complication for the purposes
of this paper, as it affects the estimates for particular countries, but not the main results
of the analysis.
4. The Shapley-Shubik index and the “redistribution paradox”
The Shapley-Shubik index is the most popular index based on the notion of P-power.
This index is suitable for explaining the distribution of power in a zero-sum game
in which the winner obtains some sort of private good. Such a game could serve to
model the distribution of pork-barrel projects though the budget, for instance. The
Shapley-Shubik index has been applied to explain the distribution of power in several
institutions of the EU such as the Council or the European Parliament (e.g. Herne
and Nurmi 1993; Widgre´n 1994; Nurmi and Meskanen 1999; Aleskerov et al. 2002;
Kauppi and Widgre´n 2007).
When we compute this index and use it to compare the distribution of power of
the Nice and Lisbon treaties, we see that there is an increase of power for very large
member states (Germany, UK, France and Italy) at the expense of the rest of smaller
member states (see Figure 1). The only exception among the latter is Romania, which
does not lose power because it had a rather small number of votes under the Nice
system relative to its population. So we end up with 22 losers as a consequence of the
new treaty. Such redistribution of power contrasts with the unanimity requirement for
amending the treaties. This is what we call the “redistribution paradox”.
Some sort of redistribution is an inevitable consequence of in any reform of the vot-
ing rules when we apply the concept of P-power, and we do not argue that this is always
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Figure 1. Shapley-Shubik index variation from Nice to Lisbon
incompatible with a unanimous treaty reform procedure. In fact, as we have pointed
out above, smaller member states can be bought off with side payments (Moravcsik
1991). What we argue is that the magnitude of the redistribution shown by the figure is
so great, because it affects so many member states and varies their power to such a great
extent, that if would be impossible to compensate them by means of side-payments fi-
nanced by the EU budget. If we add the power variations of the losing member states,
the aggregate loss amounts to 13.89%. If we assume that such power losses represent
variations in the share of the EU budget, for instance, it means that the side payments
necessary to compensate the losers would amount to 13.89% of the annual budget in-
definitely. Such a large side-payment scheme would be difficult to accommodate if we
keep in mind that the EU budget is capped at little over 1 per cent of the Union’s GDP,
and much of it is allocated to compulsory spending, such as agricultural subsidies.
In order to overcome this “redistribution” paradox, we argue that P-power indices
such as the Shapley-Shubik index presented above are not well suited to explain the
politics of the EU, which is not characterized by a large budget providing large private
gains to member states (such as pork barrel projects). Instead, EU politics is dominated
by regulatory issues that produce public goods whose benefits or costs are potentially
shared to different extents by many countries at the same time. Our hypothesis is that
member states, when they decide on a new voting rule, are not guided by relative power
considerations but by their absolute expected utility gain.
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5. The Banzhaf index and the “efficiency paradox”
The most common measure of I-power is the Banzhaf measure. Although this measure
is sometimes presented in normalized form as a relative power index where the power
shares of different member states add to unity, the nature of the index as a measure of
I-power makes it particularly useful when used in absolute terms. As said, it is almost
inevitable that any reform of the voting system will bring about winners and losers in
terms of relative voting weight. But unanimous agreement for reform is still possible
if we consider Council voting as a positive-sum game, in which utility gains for some
member states need not be at the expense of other member states. Thus, the utility of
a member state will be jointly affected by its share of voting power and the efficiency
of the voting rule, in such a way that a loss in relative voting power can be offset by a
more efficient voting rule (see Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger 2000).
This efficiency effect is not taken into account by relative voting power indices
such as the Shapley Shubik index, based on the notion of P-power where the prize is
fixed by definition, or the normalized Banzhaf index, where voting power measures are
normalized so that they add to unity, therefore losing any available information about
the efficiency of the voting rule. For instance, in the case of “One-Man-One-Vote”, all
member states have the same relative power under simple majority, qualified majority
and unanimous voting provisions (Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger 1998, p. 136). However, the
original version of the Banzhaf measure is able to produce results in terms of absolute
power.
Figure 2 shows the Banzhaf measure of the 27 member states under the Nice treaty,
the Convention’s draft and the Lisbon Treaty. If we compare the status quo ante with
the rules finally approved by the Lisbon treaty, all member states without exception
gain from the reform of the Nice Treaty. Thus, when we use the Banzhaf index to look
at power in absolute terms, the above-mentioned “redistribution paradox” disappears.
However, a new paradox arises, because all member states apparently lose from the
amendment of the Convention proposal represented by the Lisbon treaty. We will refer
to this as an “efficiency paradox”, because it is difficult to understand why any member
state would reject the Convention’s draft and agree on an amendment that made each
one of them worse off, i.e. a Pareto-inferior voting rule. If at least some member state
gained from the amendment, and as long as the Lisbon treaty was still better than the
Nice treaty for everyone, the amendment of the Convention proposal could be a result
of intergovernmental bargaining. But this does not seem to have been the case, if we
look at the results in Figure 2. In order to try to resolve this paradox, we will use an
alternative measure slightly modified assumptions about the outcome space.
6. The SSK spatial multiple-choice power index
EU Politics is seldom about choosing between black and white as there are usually a
number of grey tones in between. The spatial power index developed by Steunenberg
et al. (1999) can account for that fact, as it assumes that the preferences of the mem-
ber states are uniformly distributed among a series of equidistant options equal to the
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Figure 2. Banzhaf measure under Nice, the Convention and Lisbon
number of member states (15 in their original model) along a single dimension. Simi-
larly, we can assume that the preferences and the status quo are uniformly distributed
between 1 and 27 along a single political dimension, and compute the mean utility of
each member state under each decision rule. The results are also presented in Table A1
in the Appendix.
Figure 3 shows the mean utility of the 27 member states under the three institutional
arrangements analyzed. Now the differences between the Nice treaty, the Convention’s
draft and the Lisbon treaty are not so clear-cut as with the Banzhaf measure presented
in Figure 2, although the Lisbon Treaty appears now to be the best of the three options
in general terms. Indeed, when we compare the Lisbon treaty to the Convention’s draft
by applying SSK’s multi-option spatial model instead of Banzhaf’s binary model, the
‘efficiency paradox’ disappears. The reason is that all member states increase their
expected utility as a consequence of the amendment (although Poland seems to be at
the limit), so the Lisbon treaty would be a superior rule to the Convention’s draft in
a Paretian sense. This is a stronger result than would be necessary to eliminate the
“efficiency paradox”, for which it would be sufficient that there was a single winner
from the amendment of the Convention’s draft.
The second issue that we must look at is the so-called “redistribution paradox”
that appeared when we compared the Lisbon and Nice treaties by using the Shapley-
Shubik power index. Figure 4 compares the expected utility derived from the Lisbon
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Figure 3. SSK success under Nice, the Convention and the Lisbon Treaty
and Nice treaties by using the SSK measure of success. As compared with the Shapley-
Shubik index analysis that provided for 22 losing member states, the SSK measure
produces fewer losers, which are now only seven mid-sized member states, namely
Poland, Greece, Belgium, Portugal, Czech Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria. But even
if the number is smaller, we still have to explain how seven reticent member states
could possibly be persuaded to accept a voting rule (Lisbon treaty) that left them worse
off as compared to the status quo ante (Nice treaty) that would prevail in the event of a
veto.
As we pointed out earlier, reticent member states can be bought off with side-
payments, but only to a limited extent, given the limits to the EU budget and other
means of redistribution in the EU. Thus, side payments may work with small member
states and/or minor issues. In the Shapley-Shubik power-index analysis that we pre-
sented earlier we concluded that the amount of redistribution was so important (13.89%
of the pie) that compensation through side-payments would be very difficult to imple-
ment. We must find out whether the same happens when we use the data from the SSK
measure, or else the seven losing member states are small enough and/or their losses
are minor enough so that they can be compensated by means of side payments.
The analysis was simpler in the case of the Shapley-Shubik index because it as-
sumes that there is a fixed prize that is privately appropriated by the players of the
game. But in the case of the SSK measure, a similar kind of assessment is also pos-
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Figure 4. SSK gains and losses from the Lisbon Treaty
sible, even if the prize of the legislative game is neither fixed nor a private good. For
instance, if we assume that preferences are homogeneous within each member state, we
can obtain the aggregate utility gain of each member state by multiplying its expected
utility in Table A1 by its population. We can also estimate the aggregate utility gain
at EU-level by adding the resulting utility gains of each member state. When we do
that we find out that the aggregate loss of the seven losing states represents only 0.09%
of the overall utility gain under the Lisbon treaty. Thus, the amount of redistribution
is minimal and thus it can be perfectly compensated with a system of side payments.
This eliminates the above-mentioned “redistribution paradox”.
7. Conclusions
The results of previous studies based on relative power show that the Lisbon treaty in-
creased the voting weight of very large and very small member states at the expense of
their medium sized counterparts. This result is paradoxical if we take into account that,
according to the treaty reform procedure, the new rules were approved by unanimity
of all the 27 governments involved. When we applied a Shapley-Shubik power index
analysis we confirmed the existence of this paradox, that we called the “redistribution
paradox”. According to the main explanations of treaty negotiations, such a paradox
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could be resolved by means of side payments as long as the losing states were small
enough and/or the issues minor enough. But in this case we estimated the amount of
redistribution as 13% of the prize, too large to be accommodated by side payments.
In order to try to overcome this paradox, we used a different measure to analyze
the allocation of power, namely the Banzhaf measure, based on the notion of power as
influence (I-power) as opposed to power as the distribution of a fixed prize (P-power).
The result was that the Lisbon treaty was a Pareto superior alternative to the Nice treaty
and thus the “redistribution paradox” disappeared. But in turn a new paradox arose,
because the Lisbon treaty appeared as a Pareto inferior alternative to the Convention’s
draft and thus it was difficult to understand why member states wouldn’t unanimously
accept it rather than the Lisbon treaty. We called this the “efficiency paradox”.
In order to try to overcome this second paradox, we applied a spatial power index
based on Steunenberg et al. (1999), which is an extension of the Banzhaf measure that
considers the legislative game not as a binary choice but as a multiple choice between
several alternatives along a single issue dimension.
The main results of the paper are two-fold. Firstly, EU legislative politics should
not be seen as a zero-sum game in which member states can gain only at the expense
of others but as a positive-sum game. EU politics is more about making policies than
about forming and dividing the spoils of a coalition government or the distribution of
a large budget. That is why absolute power indices based on the notion of I-power are
better suited to explain EU politics than relative ones based on the notion of P-power.
Secondly, EU politics is seldom an election between black and white. Rather it
is more about choosing public policies along a certain political dimension. Thus, the
extent to which a member state is able to shape those policies is more important than
the mere fact of being inside or outside a winning coalition. EU politics should not be
seen as a binary choice between being inside or outside the coalition, but about how
much one benefits from a given piece of legislation that affects every member state
to a different extent. That is why spatial power indices such as the one developed by
Steunenberg et al. (1999), which incorporate information about the structure of the
policy space, can be useful to explain EU politics.
These two features are particularly true in the case of the EU where, on the one
hand, the budget represents little over 1 percent of the Union’s GNP and, on the other
hand, politics is not characterized by a bipartisan government-opposition dynamics
of most national political systems. Not in vain, a number of empirical studies have
shown that EU politics in not characterized by the existence of stable coalitions across
issues (Thomson et al. 2004). Taking into account the territorial nature of interest
representation in the Council, this is probably a good thing for the integrity of the
Union.
Another important result is that power index analysis can help us understand the
process of the negotiations leading to the reform of voting rules in the EU. This is par-
ticularly important taking into account the somewhat paradoxical nature of preliminary
results might discourage some authors from using power indices. Surely, the substan-
tive results of this paper should be treated with caution, as they are based on a small
number of observations (the move from the treaty of Nice to the Convention draft and
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from this to the Lisbon treaty), but the insights provided may be useful for the analysis
of other past and future reforms.
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